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Hedge Fund Seeding via Fees-for-Seed Swaps under
Idiosyncratic Risk
Christian Ewald1 and Hai Zhang2
1 2Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow
Abstract. We develop a dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding business
by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse manager who
launches a hedge fund through a seeding vehicle. This vehicle, i.e. fees-for-seed swap,
specifies that a strategic partner (seeder) provides a critical amount of capital in exchange
for participation in the funds revenue. Our results indicate that the new swap not only
solves the serious problem of widespread financing constraints for new and early-stage
funds (ESFs) managers, but can be highly beneficial to both the manager and the seeder
if structured properly.
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G23
1. Introduction
There has been a significant increase in both the number of hedge fund seeders and the
amount of capital available for hedge fund seeding since the aftermath of 2008’s market
upheaval.1 However, there still remains a tremendous shortage of capital for new and
early-stage funds (ESFs). This is mainly because most capital providers or institutional
investors increasingly focus on larger established hedge funds whose assets under man-
agement (AUM) are usually larger than 1 billion and who are considered highly credible.
Additionally a larger talent pool of ESFs managers is now competing for the scarce avail-
able seed capital. Worse still, barriers to entry for ESFs are much higher today than in
the period before the 2008 financial crisis.2
Therefore, navigating the terrain to a successful launch of a hedge fund has become
more difficult and the financing constraint faced by ESFs managers nowadays is much
more serious than before. In order to reach the initial AUM target and cover organizational
1 HFM-Week research reported in November 2011 that seeders had approximately $4.6
billion in available capital, compared to approximately $1 billion just one year earlier.
2 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Title IV) compels
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to impose reporting requirements
on all hedge funds as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
assessment of systemic risk. According to “Launch bad; Hedge funds” (The Economist 20
Apr. 2013: 79), it is much harder now to break into the hedge-fund business than it used
to be because of the rising expenses, more risk-averse investors and enhanced regulation.
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expenses, more and more ESFs managers are likely to turn to seed investors for early stage
of capital through a seeding vehicle. This is an arrangement to which we refer as fees-for-
seed swap that specifies that a seed investor (or seeder) commonly commits to providing a
remarkable amount of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an “anchor investor” in a new
fund in exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which is usually the fees that the
ESFs manager generates from the entire pool of assets in the fund. If structured properly,
the seeding approach can be highly beneficial to the ESFs manager and to investors
who provide the seed capital. It is not uncommon that the hedge fund seeder receives a
portion of the hedge fund’s revenue stream to get greater return potential than an ordinary
investor.
In general a seeder can expect about 1% of revenues for each $1 million of seed capital
for seed transactions no larger than $50 million. However, seed arrangements can vary
substantially based on factors such as the experience of the manager, the alpha record,
the amount of seed capital provided, the withdrawal and lock-up period terms, and the
relative negotiating power of each party.3
While the seed investor will often demand the flexibility to redeem her4 investment
as soon as possible, the manager needs (and should require) the seed capital to remain
invested for a period sufficient to set its strategy, create a track record, and procure other
investors. Generally, during the lock-up period, the seed investor should be prohibited
from redeeming the investment if, in the reasonable judgment of the manager, doing so
could adversely affect the interests of the other investors in the fund.5
The ordinary investors may withdraw capital if the fund shows poor performance. For
simplicity , we assume that the withdrawal rate is constant. This is a common assumption
in the hedge fund literature and has been employed by Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross
(2003) and Lan, Wang and Yang (2013). Also, depending on the terms of the deal, the
seeder will generally commit to keep the investment in the fund for a defined lock-up
period, typically two to four years. It makes sense to assume that during this initial
phase, idiosyncratic risks take a more pronounced role as compared to later stages in
the fund’s life, possibly due to ordinary investors entering (or leaving) the fund and/or
the fund manager experimenting with different asset classes in order to set up a successful
strategy. As seed commitments expire, AUM will be divided among the ordinary investors,
the seeder, and the ESFs manager according to a ”waterfall” schedule.6 After the initial
seeding stage, the fund becomes more stable and in our idealized setup we assume that
the ESFs manager no longer bears any idiosyncratic risk after the lock-up period has been
completed. Therefore, we can apply Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross’ (Goetzmann, Ingersoll and
Ross (2003)) model to calculate the market value of the fund at termination of the lock-
up period. While the manager’s performance incentives during the lock-up period are
implemented through a waterfall schedule, performance incentives after the lock-up period
3 Source form Larch Lane Advisors: Hedge Fund Seeding: A Compelling Alternative.
4 Rather than using the gender neutral “she/he” and “her/his” we have chosen for sim-
plicity to simply use the pronouns “she” and “her” throughout the manuscript.
5 Infrequently, a seeder may identify certain conditions under which it will be permit-
ted to redeem investment, prior to the lock-up period, such as in the event of poor fund
performance, management attrition, sale or transfer of control of the management en-
tity, criminal convictions or regulatory violations and material breaches of the investment
parameters or provisions of the seed investment agreement.
6 See details in the next Section.
Hedge Fund Seeding via Fees-for-Seed Swaps under Idiosyncratic Risk 3
are provided by a high-water-mark (HWM) incentive, compare Goetzmann, Ingersoll and
Ross (2003).
As there is no publicly available data on the historical performance of seeding strategies,
there are only very few simple models in practice focusing on hedge fund seeding return,
volatility and liquidity profile.7 To our knowledge, this paper provides the first dynamic
framework on valuation of the hedge fund seeding business by solving the portfolio-choice
problem for a risk-averse manager.
Several other studies evaluate the performance of hedge funds focusing on different as-
pects. Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) provide the first quantitative inter-temporal
valuation framework of investors’ payoff and managers’ fees in a setting where the fund’s
value follows a log-normal process and the fund managers have no discretion over the
choice of portfolio. Carpenter (2000) shows that it is optimal for hedge fund managers
who face no explicit downside risk to choose infinite volatility as asset value goes to zero.
This behavior is referred to as risk-shifting. Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2007), Hodder
and Jackwerth (2007) and Aragon and Nanda (2012) argue though that a manager’s
convex payoff structure does not necessarily induce risk shifting when the fund shows
poor performance as long as the manager is exposed to downside risk, either through her
ownership of fund share or through her annual fees. Panageas and Westerfield (2009),
and Lan, Wang and Yang (2013) analyze the impact of management fees and high-water
mark based incentive fee on leverage and valuation. None of these studies, however, model
the hedge fund seeding innovation in the context of the ESFs manager’s portfolio choice
problem, and hence they do not assess the costs of illiquidity and unspanned risk of hedge
fund seeding investments.
Our article also relates to the literature about valuation and portfolio choice with
illiquid assets, such as restricted stocks, executive compensation, illiquid entrepreneurial
businesses, and private equity (PE) investments. For example, Kahl, Liu and Longstaff
(2003) analyze a continuous-time portfolio choice model with restricted stocks. Both Chen,
Miao and Wang (2010) and Wang, Wang and Yang (2012) study entrepreneurial firms with
unspanned idiosyncratic risks under incomplete markets. For PE investments, Sorensen,
Wang and Yang (2014) develop a dynamic valuation model of PE investments by solving
the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse investor, who invests in a private equity
fund, managed by a general partner. We are unaware, though, of any existing models
that capture the illiquidity, managerial skill (alpha), risk attitude and compensation of
the hedge fund seeding business. Capturing these important features in a model that is
sufficiently tractable to determine the subjective value of fees in the hedge fund seeding
business is one of the main contributions of this study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. presents a dynamic valuation framework
for modeling hedge fund seeding innovation and the impact of incentive contracts, man-
agerial stake and hedge fund liquidation on a risk-averse ESFs manager’s consumption
and portfolio-choice behavior. A solution for this model is derived in Section 3.. Section
4. and Section 5. discuss numerical results for breakeven alphas, seed costs and subjective
value of management compensation. The main conclusions are summarized in Section 6..
The appendix provides detailed computations relating to the market value of the hedge
fund after the initial seeding stage.
7 Larch Lane Advisors LLC constructed a simple model to project returns and cash flows
for a seeded fund featuring an innovative seeding strategy.
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2. Model Setup
2.1 Hedge fund seeding investment opportunities
We consider an infinitely-lived risk-averse ESFs manager who has the opportunity to
launch a take-it-or-leave-it hedge fund at present time 0, which requires to raise the tar-
get AUM S0. All sources of uncertainty arise from two independent standard Brownian
motions B and Z defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0},P), where
F ≡ {Ft : t ≥ 0} describes the flow of information available to the seeder.
In addition to the opportunity of launching a fund, the manager has access to standard
financial investment opportunities, see Merton (1971). Let Wt denote the ESFs manager’s
liquid (financial) wealth process. At any time t ≥ 0 the manager invests an amount of Πt
in a diversified market portfolio and the remaining amount Wt −Πt in the risk-free asset
with a constant interest rate r. The return of the diversified market portfolio is denoted
by R and satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, (1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants, and η ≡ (µM − r)/σM is the Sharpe ratio of the
market portfolio.
We assume that AUM of the hedge fund {St : t ≥ 0} follows a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM):
dSt
St
= (µ− ω −m)dt+ ρσdBt +
√
1− ρ2σdZt, S0 ≡ S given, (2)
where µ, ω,m and σ are constants; µ is the expected growth rate, ωS is the regular
withdrawals or distribution among investors, mS is the management fee continuously
occurring at the rate mS8, σ is the total volatility of hedge fund growth and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is
the correlation coefficient between the hedge fund and the return on the market portfolio
given by (1).9 The parameters ξ ≡ ρσ and  ≡
√
1− ρ2σ are respectively the systematic
and idiosyncratic volatility of the hedge fund. Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross
(2003), we define α ≡ µ− r − β(µM − r) ≡ µ− r − ρ σσM (µM − r) ≡ µ− r − ρση as the
premium return on ESFs, i.e. the managers’ skills in CAPM context.10
8 Hedge fund managers normally receive 20% of the increase in fund value in excess of
the last recorded maximum, i.e. high-water-mark (henceforth, HWM) as incentive fee in
addition to 2% of AUM as annual fees, a compensation structure often referred to as
two-twenty and considered as the industry standard. Several academic articles study the
characteristics of hedge fund fees, such as Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh (1999)),
andAragon and Nanda (2012).
9 Unlike the standard literature which uses a HWM incentive structure throughout the
whole lifetime of the fund, our model assumes a two-to-twenty rule under which the ESFs
manager obtains incentive fees at the end of the lock-up period through a waterfall schedule
only, and then for the remaining lifetime of the fund obtains incentive fees through a HWM
rule.
10 According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR) the 10-year period between 1994 and 2004
saw funds with less than a three-year track record outperform older funds by over 5%
annually, with nearly identical volatility. Other studies, Aiken, Clifford and Ellis (2013)
and Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) made a number of adjustments to raw performance data
to mitigate survivorship or backfill biases.
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The Brownian motions B and Z provide the sources of market risk (systematic) and
idiosyncratic risk of the hedge fund, respectively. A higher absolute value |ρ| of the corre-
lation coefficient implies that the systematic volatility has a larger weight, ceteris paribus.
2.2 Seeding innovation with fees-for-seed swap
Since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a tremendous shortage
of capital available to ESFs. Investors have learnt their lessons from the financial crisis
and become smarter and more cautious about their investments. This has tightened the
financing constraints of hedge fund managers even further. According to the Seward &
Kissel New Hedge Fund Study (2014), 65% of funds within the Study obtained some form
of founders capital (significantly higher than the 43% in the 2013 study). Moreover, based
on conversations with various industry participants, the study estimates, that within the
entire hedge fund industry for the calendar year 2014, at least 40% of all launches greater
than $75 million (and an estimated 15% of all fund launches) had some form of seed
capital.
In order to attract sufficient capital to cover organizational expenses and be considered
credible, hedge fund managers may seek a strategic partner or a seeder who provides a
critical amount of seed capital φS0 in exchange for economic participation in the funds
revenue, i.e. a proportion ψ of the manager’s fees including both management fee and
performance fees in the seeding stage.
2.3 Waterfall schedule upon the expiration of seed investments
At the end of the lock-up period at time T , AUM ST will be divided among the ordinary
investors, the seeder, and the manager according to a so-called “waterfall” schedule, similar
as in Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014). More specifically, let y denote the hurdle rate
during the lock-up period for the ordinary investors, whose maximum payment at maturity
T in consequence is:
Z0 = (1− φ)S0eyT . (3)
Any remaining proceeds after deducting the ordinary investors’ share, Z0, and returning
the seed capital with preferred hurdle rate h, i.e. φS0e
hT , constitute the profits of the
ESFs, given by:
ST − Z1, (4)
where Z1 ≡ Z0 + φS0ehT is the upper boundary that equals to the sum of the maximum
payment to the ordinary investors and the preferred return for the seeder. These profits
are divided between the ordinary investors and the ESFs manager. The manager receives
her carried interest, while the ordinary investor’s share along with his maximum payments
remain in AUM after the seeding stage. Therefore, there are three regions of the waterfall
structure, depending on the amount of AUM at the end of the lock-up period.
Region 1: Hurdle rate for the ordinary investors (ST ≤ Z0) In our model, the
ordinary investors’ payoffs is senior to the seeder’s investment, thus the seeder and the
manager receive nothing if ST falls below the boundary of Z0. The guaranteed payment
to the ordinary investors is given by:
OP1(AT , T ) = min{ST , Z0}. (5)
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Region 2: Preferred return (Z0 ≤ ST ≤ Z1) At the upper boundary of this region,
the seeder gets her seed capital back with a prescribed hurdle rate h, φS0e
hT , and the
seeder’s payoff in this region, at maturity T , is:
SP (ST , T ) = max{ST − Z0, 0} −max{ST − Z1, 0}. (6)
Region 3: The ESFs manager’s carried interest (ST > Z1) After deducting the
guaranteed payment and preferred return of the seed capital, the ESFs manager claims
her carried interest, the fraction k of the profits ST − Z1, given by:
GP (ST , T ) = k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}. (7)
Denote OP3(ST , T ) as the ordinary investors’ share in this region which is given by:
OP3(ST , T ) = (1− k) ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}. (8)
One can easily compute the sum of the payoffs of all agents, at maturity T , which
satisfies:
OP1(AT , T ) +OP3(ST , T ) + SP (ST , T ) +GP (ST , T ) = ST . (9)
After returning the seed capital, only the ordinary investors’ payoff remains in the fund,
and the adjusted AUM S∗T is:
S∗T ≡ OP (AT , T ) = OP1(AT , T ) +OP3(ST , T ). (10)
Therefore, the ordinary investors’ claim at maturity T , denoted by OP ∗(AT , T ), satisfies:
OP ∗(AT , T ) = I(S∗T , S
∗
T ), (11)
where I(S∗T , S
∗
T ), the investors’ claim in the Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross model, is deter-
mined by (A.11) in Appendix A. Appendix A presents more details about the market
value of the ordinary investors’ claim after the seeding stage.
2.4 The manager’s problem
The ESFs manager’s standard time separable preference is characterized by her initial
wealthW0 and a pure subjective discount rate δ, and her utility function U(C), represented
by:
max
cs
E
[∫ ∞
0
exp (−δs)U(cs)ds
]
. (12)
For tractability, we assume the manager has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
utility preference, given by
U(c) = − exp(−γc)/γ, (13)
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The overall time horizon [0,∞)
entails the lock-up period [0, T ] during which the manager faces idiosyncratic risk (possibly
due to assets in the fund being less liquid and proprietary) as well as the remaining period
[T,∞), during which it is assumed that the underlying risks are fully spanned by public
assets, as in Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014) section 3.11
11 This is an idealization of the fact that idiosyncratic risks in the start up of the fund
and in particular during the lock-up period are significantly higher than when the fund
has established itself.
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2.5 Manager’s liquid wealth dynamics
During the lock-up period, the manager’s financial wealth evolves according to,
dWt = (rWt + (1− ψ)mS − ct)dt+ Πt((µM − r)dt+ σMdBt), 0 < t < T. (14)
The first term in Equation (14) is the wealth accumulation when the manager fully invests
in the risk free asset, plus the revenue of managing the ESFs net of her consumption. The
second term is the excess return from the manager’s investment in the market portfolio.
At the end of the lock-up period T , the manager’s wealth (including current portfolio
wealth and futures management fees) jumps from WT− to WT , with
WT = WT− +G(ST , T )
= WT− + (1− ψ)[k ∗GP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )].
(15)
The second term on the right hand side of Equation (15) represents the carried interest
of the hedge fund seeding business. The term F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) consists of the market value of
future fees paid to the manager after the lock-up period. Per assumption, the risk to which
the fund is exposed after the lock-up period is fully spanned by public assets, as such the
market value of the fees can be computed under the appropriate risk neutral measure as in
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003). An explicit expression for F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) is provided
in Equation (A.12) in Appendix A. The dynamic programming principle and the fact that
we have full spanning over the period [T,∞) implies that the solution of problem (12)
can now been obtained from the solution of the corresponding problem starting at time
T with wealth dynamics
dWt = (rWt + Πt(µM − r)− ct)dt+ ΠtσMdBt, (16)
and initial wealth WT according to (15), and then by backward induction over the interval
[0, T ] as in the following section.
3. Model Solution
In this section, we first derive seed costs with fees-for-seed swaps for the ESFs manager
and the breakeven alpha for the ordinary investors. Then we analyze the manager’s con-
sumption and portfolio choice in a dynamic valuation model taking account of illiquidity,
ESFs managers’ value-adding skills (alpha), incentive compensation, and the fees-for-seed
swap. However, the idiosyncratic risk which is present in the hedge funds seeding business
invalidates the standard two-step complete-markets (Arrow-Debreu) analysis (first value
maximization and then optimal consumption allocation)12 due to the non-separability be-
tween value maximization and consumption smoothing. In order to derive the solution,
we first solve the standard Merton consumption and portfolio choice problem faced by the
manager after the expiration of the lock-up period, similar as in Merton (1971) and Goet-
zmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003). Following this, we solve an optimal control problem
maximizing the ESFs manager’s utility during the seeding stage.
12 See more details in Cox and Huang (1989)
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3.1 Market value of total fees and call options on the seeding investment
We assume that the market prices cash-flows attached to liquid assets by using a risk
neutral measure Q equivalent to the measure P when restricted to all Ft for any t ≥
0.13 The corresponding state-price deflator pi satisfies dpi = −rpidt− ηpidZ, pi0 = 1 and
restricted to (Ω,Ft), we have λt = dQdP
∣∣
Ft and λt = exp(rt)
pit
pi0
, see Duffie (2001).
Denote by ν ≡ µ− ω −m− ρση ≡ α+ r − ω −m the risk-adjusted drift rate of AUM,
and BQt a standard Brownian motion satisfying dB
Q
t = dBt + ηdt. Then under Q, the
dynamics of AUM in (2) can be rewritten as
dSt = νStdt+ ρσStdB
Q
t + StdZt. (17)
Let G∗(St, t) be the market value of the claim underlying St with a payment flow
mSs for s ∈ [t, T ] and a terminal payoff G∗(ST , T ) ≡ k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}+ F (S∗T , S∗T ) .
According to the dynamic asset pricing theory (Duffie (2001)), it can be written as a
conditional expectation under the risk-adjusted measure Q:
G∗(St, t) = EQt
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)mSsds+ e−r(T−t)G∗(ST , T )
]
. (18)
By using Ito’s formula, G∗(St, t) satisfies the follow PDE:
rG∗(St, t) = mS +G∗t + νStG
∗
S(St, t) +
1
2
σ2S2t V G
∗
SS(St, t), (19)
with two boundary conditions
G∗(0, t) = 0,
G∗(ST , T ) = k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}+ F (S∗T , S∗T ),
(20)
where F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) is the market value of total fees generated after the lock-up period expires
at time T , given by (A.12) in the Appendix A.
Similar to Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014), the value at time t of a plain-vanilla Eu-
ropean call option with strike price K and terminal payoff max{ST −K, 0} at T , denoted
by Call(St, t, α,K), is given by:
Call(St, t, α,K) = EQt
[
e−r(T−t) max{ST −K, 0}
]
,
= e(α−ω−m)(T−t)EQt
[
e−ν(T−t) max{ST −K, 0}
]
,
= e(α−ω−m)(T−t)
[
StN(d1)−Ke−ν(T−t)N(d2)
]
,
= Ste
(α−ω−m)(T−t)N(d1)−Ke−r(T−t)N(d2),
(21)
where
d1 = d2 + σ
√
T − t,
d2 =
ln(St/K)+(ν−σ2/2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t .
(22)
The pricing formula here is different from the classic Black-Scholes formula as we assume
that the investment of the hedge fund seeding business could generate excess alpha.
13 Such a measure may not be unique due to incompleteness, but we assume here that
the market has chosen a risk neutral measure, which in consequence becomes the market
measure.
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3.2 Seed costs with fees-for-seed swaps
Under the arrangement of a fees-for-seed swap during the hedge fund seeding stage, the
ESFs manager must give up a portion (ψ) of her fees in exchange for the seed capital
(φS0). The cost ψ of the seed capital with fees-for-seed swap, is determined endogenously
within the model, in such a way that the value of the contract is zero at initiation.
Generally speaking, a seeder is usually a diversified investor who signs such contracts
with a large number of ESFs and therefore the idiosyncratic risk of the hedge fund seeding
business is well-diversified.14 Thus, the seed capital provided by the seeder must be equal to
the market value (equilibrium value) of the fees allocated to the seeder when the contract
commences. That is
φS0 = ψG
∗(S0, 0),
ψ = φS0
G∗(S0,0) .
(23)
In addition to revenue sharing, seeding investments will be returned to seeders more
or less by SP (ST , T ) depending on the performance of the fund at the end of the lock-up
period. Using the pricing formula defined in the last subsection, one can derive an explicit
expression for SP (St, t), the time t value of this claim, that is
SP (St, t) = Call(St, t, α, Z0)− Call(St, t, α, Z1). (24)
Therefore, the time t value of the seeders’ claim, denoted by SP ∗(St, t), is given by:
SP ∗(St, t) = SP (St, t) + ψ ∗G∗(St, t). (25)
3.3 Break-even alpha
In Section 2., we considered the terminal payoffs (OP ∗(ST , T )) for the ordinary investors
at maturity T . Its present value, denoted by I∗(St, t), satisfies:
I∗(St, t) = E
Q
t
[
e−r(T−t)I(S∗T , S
∗
T )
]
. (26)
By using Ito’s formula, we obtain the following PDE:
rI∗(St, t) = ωSt + I∗t + νStI
∗
S(St, t) +
1
2
σ2S2t V I
∗
SS(St, t), (27)
with the following two boundary conditions defined below:
I∗(ST , T ) = I(S∗T , S
∗
T ),
I∗(0, t) = 0.
(28)
In order to break-even at the start of the fund, the ordinary investors’ claim has to be
equal to their initial investment, i.e. I∗(S0, 0) = (1− φ)S0. Particularly, ordinary investors
benefit (suffer the loss) from their investment in the ESFs if I∗(S0, 0) ≥ (≤)(1− φ)S0
when the contract commences. Using (27) to solve I∗(S0, 0) = (1− φ)S0 for α provides
the minimum alpha that should be generated by the ESFs manager for the ordinary
investors to break-even when the contract commences.
14 For example, Larch Lane Advisors LLC (“Larch Lane”) , one of the first dedicated
providers of hedge fund seed capital, has seeded 25 hedge funds and continues to be an
active capital provider for the hedge fund industry.
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3.4 Consumption and portfolio choice after the lock-up period
As indicated in section 2.5, the manager’s investment problem after the lock-up period has
expired at time T is equivalent to the classical Merton problem studied in Merton (1971),
where the initial wealth WT consists of realized portfolio value prior to time T , waterfall
schedule payoff at time T and the market value of future management and performance
fees after time T . The optimal consumption and portfolio rule is therefore given by
c∗(W ) = r
(
W +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)
, (29)
Π∗ =
η
γrσM
, (30)
where W is the liquid wealth level.
The maximum of the expected utility of consumption after the seeding stage can be
computed as
Je(W ) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
W +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (31)
3.5 Manager’s decisions and certainty equivalent valuation
Define Js(W,S, t) as the manager’s value function before the the end of the seeding stage,
i.e.
Js(W,S, t) = max
(cs,Πs)
E
[∫ T
t
exp (−δ(s− t))U(cs)ds+ e−δ(T−t)Je(WT )
∣∣∣∣Wt = W,St = S] ,
(32)
where W is the manager’s financial wealth process, and the function Je(·) is given by
(31). In light of section 2.5. the value function Js(W0, S0, 0) coincides with the value
of the problem (12). During the lock-up period, the manager’s financial wealth evolves
according to,
dWt = (rWt + Πt(µM − r) + (1− ψ)mS − ct)dt+ ΠtσMdBt, 0 < t < T, (33)
while as previously discussed, at the end of the lock-up period the wealth jumps to
WT = WT− +G(ST , T )
= WT− + (1− ψ)[k ∗GP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )].
(34)
Compared to the exogenously given fraction of management fees retained by the seeder
in practice, the fraction ψ in our model is endogenously determined by the fees-for-
seed swap. In this case, the manager’s value function Js(W,S, t) satisfies the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
δJs(W,S, t) = sup
c≥0,Π
{U(c) + Jst + (rW + Π(µM − r) + (1− ψ)mS − c)JsW
+ 1
2
(ΠσM )
2JsWW + ΠσMσρSJ
s
WS + µSJ
s
S +
1
2
σ2S2JsSS}.
(35)
The first-order conditions for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice are:
U ′(c) = JsW (W,S, t), (36)
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Π(S, t) =
−JsW
JsWW
(
µM − r
σM 2
)
+
−JsWS
JsWW
ρσS
σM
. (37)
According to the utility indifference pricing principle, the utility indifference price 15 of
the management fee owned by the ESFs manager in the seeding stage, denoted by G(S, t)
16 , satisfies
Js(W,S, t) = Je(W +G(S, t)) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
W +G(S, t) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (38)
Substituting (36), (37), and (38) into (35), we obtain the following theorem immediately:
Theorem 1. During the seeding stage for t ∈ [0, T ], the optimal consumption and port-
folio rule is given by
c∗(W,S, t) = r
[
W +G(S, t) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
]
, (39)
Π∗(S, t) =
η
γrσM
− ρσ
σM
SGS(S, t), (40)
where G(S, t) is the utility indifference price of the fees owned by the manager, which is
the solution of the following partial differential equation (PDE):
rG(S, t) = (1− ψ)mS +Gt + νSGS(S, t) + 1
2
σ2S2GSS(S, t)− γr
2
2S2GS(S, t)
2, (41)
subject to the following two boundary conditions:
G(ST , T ) = (1− φ)[kGP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )] (42)
G(0, t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (43)
The first boundary condition states that, at maturity T , the ESFs manager collects her
carried interest plus the market fees paid by an outside manager. The second boundary
condition reflects that the value of the manager’s fees falls down to zero as the underlying
AUM converges to zero during the lock-up period.
Equations (39) and (40) indicate that the hedge fund manager will consume the implied
value G(S, t) and use the market portfolio to dynamically hedge the hedge fund seeding
business risk. More specifically, equation (39) indicates that the manager’s consumption
is equal to the annuity value of the sum of financial wealth W and the implicit value
of the hedge fund seeding business G(S, t) plus two constant terms which appear in the
classical Merton rule, see Merton (1971). The portfolio-choice rule is given by equation
(40) in which the second term represents the manager’s hedging demand in the context of
her hedge fund seeding business. Equation (41) implies that if the absolute risk-aversion
index equals zero (i.e. the ESFs manager is risk-neutral towards the idiosyncratic risk),
equation (41) becomes the standard equilibrium pricing equation. Therefore, the last term
on the right side of equation (41) captures the idiosyncratic risk effect on the managers
valuation of the hedge fund business.
15 It is sometimes called certainty equivalent wealth, which is the risk-adjusted subjective
value of managing the hedge fund seeding business.
16 Thanks to the exponential utility assumption, the utility indifference price is indepen-
dent of the wealth level of the fund manager.
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4. Breakeven Alphas and Seed Costs
We have derived the solution of the fees-for-seed swap portion ψ referred to as the seed
cost and the subjective value of the ESFs manager’s compensation in Section 3. In this
section we provide some numerical results in order to develop more economic intuition.
Baseline breakeven parameters are chosen according to Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014).
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in our baseline breakeven case.
Table 1 Summary of key parameters in baseline breakeven case
Parameter Symbol Value
Risk-free rate r 5%
Expected return of market portfolio µM 11%
Expected return of the ESFs µ
Volatility of market portfolio σM 20%
Volatility of the ESFs σ 25%
Market Sharpe ratio η 30%
Guaranteed yield y 5%
Hurdle rate h 8%
Management fee m 2%
Incentive fee k 20%
Lock-up period T 2
Managerial skills α
Subjective discount rate δ 5%
Idiosyncratic risk  23%
Seed capital ratio φ 5%
Correlation coefficient ρ 40%
Exogenous liquidation barrier l 50%
Withdrawal rate, the liquidation parameter ω + λ 5%
Coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ 2
4.1 Breakeven alphas, compensation contracts, and seed capital involvement
How important is the managerial ability of producing superior performance (alpha)? In
order to develop more economic intuition, Table 2 presents breakeven alphas in different
compensation contracts for various levels of seed capitals. We first consider the case with-
out any fees, m = k = 0%. No positive alpha is then required by the ordinary investors
for the case of no seed capitals. Interestingly, the ordinary investors can even bear some
loss if the fund gets some seed capitals. For example, the ordinary investors’ investments
breakeven for a negative alpha, α = −0.77%, in the case that the seeder provides 15% of
AUM seed capital as the anchor investor, which means the ordinary investors are more
willing to invest in the fund by following the seeders.
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Moreover, some typical compensation contracts are compared in Table 2. Naturally,
increasing either m or k increases the breakeven alpha, for a given level of seed investments.
More specifically, holding the seed capital ratio fixed, increasing the management fee rate
m by 0.5 percentage-points results in an increase of the breakeven alpha by the same
amount. However, increasing k by 10 % increases the breakeven alpha by 0.55% to 0.75%,
depending on seed capital ratio.
Table 2 provides evidence that an ESFs manager would easily reach the target AUM
level to launch a fund via a seeding vehicle as the ordinary investors benefit from the
scheme. However, the ESFs manager backed up with seed capital has to give certain
fraction (ψ) of her fees revenues as compensation to the seeder, and we will analyze these
seed costs in the following subsection.
Table 2 The table gives breakeven alphas for different levels of seed capital ratio, φ,
incentive fees k and management fees, m. Other parameters are β = 0.5, h = 8%, T = 2
years, and S0 = 100.
m k φ = 0 φ = 5% φ = 10% φ = 15%
0.0% 0% 0.00% -0.24% -0.50% -0.77%
1.5% 10% 2.14% 1.89% 1.62% 1.35%
1.5% 20% 2.79% 2.50% 2.22% 1.93%
1.5% 30% 3.54% 3.16% 2.83% 2.51%
2.0% 10% 2.65% 2.39% 2.12% 1.85%
2.0%a 20% 3.29% 3.00% 2.72% 2.43%
2.0% 30% 4.03% 3.66% 3.33% 3.01%
2.5% 10% 3.15% 2.89% 2.62% 2.35%
2.5% 20% 3.78% 3.50% 3.21% 2.93%
2.5% 30% 4.54% 4.16% 3.83% 3.51%
a Indicates the baseline breakeven case.
4.2 The seeder’s value and seed costs
We refer to the last section for the seeder’s value given by Equation (25). Not surprisingly,
the seeder’s value is significantly affected by the fund’s performance as the left hand sub-
figures in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate. For example, the seeder’s value has more than
tripled as the fund AUM is doubled (from S0 = 100 to 200). On the other hand, the right
subfigure in Figure 1 shows that the seeder’s value is almost insensitive to time t, given
AUM fixed at 100. The seeder’s value changes only with time t near the maturity and
AUM staying around Z0 and Z1. This is mainly because the seeder’s positions in these
options are in the money when AUM goes to the interval around Z0 and Z1.
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Fig. 1. The figure provides comparative statics for the seeder’s payoffs with respect
to time t and AUM S for different levels of seed capital.
Unlike an ad-hoc ”rule of thumb” decision on the fees-for-seed ratio which is often
common in practice, our paper provides a closed-form solution for the seed cost ψ which
is informed by a number of factors such as the amount of the seed capital, the manager’s
alpha, the risk of the fund, etc. and takes account some key principles from Finance theory.
Interestingly, the right hand subfigure in Figure 2 shows that the fees-for-seed ratio ψ is
indeed a linearly increasing function of the seed capital which could be interpreted as a rule
of thumb in practice. However note that the slope of the function varies with parameters
such as the managerial skills. In details, the seeder demands more fund revenue share for
a manager with negative alpha (-1%) than that for a more talented manager (5%) and
the difference can be up to 40 % if providing 20 % of the initial AUM (S0).
5. Seeding Investments with Lock-up Period, Subjective Value of
Fees, and Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section, we further analyze the effects of the lock-up period, seeding investment,
and idiosyncratic risk on management compensation, illiquidity discount, and the economic
value of the fund.
5.1 Lock-up period effects, illiquidity discount and management compensation
Table 3 presents valuations for the ordinary investors, the seeder, and the ESFs manager
for various levels of alpha. Panel A of Table 3, with a short lock-up period, shows that the
ordinary investors breakeven with α = 3.13%, while the seeder’s values for various alphas
Hedge Fund Seeding via Fees-for-Seed Swaps under Idiosyncratic Risk 15
0
1
20
100
200
0
5
10
15
20
Time tAUM S
SP
(S
,t)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Seed Capital Ratio φ
Se
ed
 C
os
ts
 ψ
 
 
α=5%
α*=3%
α=−1%
Fig. 2. The figure presents comparative statics for the seeder’s value with respect
to Tt and S, and seed costs ψ with respect to seed capital ratio for three different
levels of alpha.
outperform her initial seeding investment φ · S0 = 5. This is straightforward because the
seeder has an extra option value in addition to the breakeven swap when the seeding
contract commences. As the alpha decreases from 5% to -1% the seed cost ψ increases
from 9.98% to 19.94 %, which makes sure the seeder breakeven at the beginning of the
contract. Due to the unspanned risk of the seeding business, the ESFs manager bears
the illiquidity costs. Similar to Wang, Wang and Yang (2012), the illiquidity discount for
the manager is defined as the difference of the market value and the certainty-equivalent
value of fees, which is given by ID = G∗(S0, 0)−G(S0, 0). This discount is the amount the
manager would be willing to pay for not bearing the idiosyncratic risk during the initial
seeding stage. As we can see from Table 3, the amount of ID increases by 1.8 to 2.44 as
increasing alpha from -1% to 5%.
In Table 3, Panel B, with a relative long lock-up period T = 4 years, shows the illiquidity
discount is much greater than that in Panel A. For the case of α = 5%, the discount for
T = 4 around is six times of that in Panel A. This means the manager bears more illiquidity
discount for longer lock-up periods. Moreover, the seeder also suffers a loss for a long lock-
up period. For example, fixing α = −1%, the seeder suffers losses of 1.03 (around 20% of
her initial investment) by extending the lock-up period from 6 months to 4 years.
5.2 Seed capitals effects, economic values of the fund
Table 4 presents results of economic values of the fund and subjective values of fees with
or without seeding vehicle (shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively) for various levels
of alpha. More specifically, the economic value of the fund with seed capital is less (more)
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Table 3 The table presents valuations of different agents’ claims with non-spanned risk
for various levels of alpha. The columns refer to: the ordinary investors’ interest (I∗),
the seeders’ payoffs (SP ∗), the market value of fees (G∗), the economic value of the ESFs
(V = I∗ + SP ∗ +G∗), the ESFs manager’s certain-equivalent valuation (G), the illiquidity
discount (ID = G∗ −G), and the seed costs (ψ). Parameter values are γ = 2, S0 = 100,
m = 2%, k = 20%, φ = 5%, β = 0.5, and h = 8%. Panel A and B report the results for the
case with the lock-up periods T = 0.5 and T = 4, respectively.
α(%) I∗ SP ∗ G∗ V G ID ψ(%)
Panel A: T = 0.5
-1.0 64.53 7.19 20.07 91.79 19.63 0.44 19.94
0.00 69.96 7.25 22.79 100.00 21.19 0.65 17.99
2.00 84.38 7.36 30.19 121.93 29.11 1.08 14.21
3.13 a 95.00 7.42 35.91 138.33 34.42 1.49 12.22
5.00 106.38 7.53 45.09 159.01 42.86 2.24 9.98
Panel B: T = 4
-1.0 64.04 6.16 20.54 90.74 18.43 2.11 19.58
0.00 70.15 6.29 23.56 100.00 20.04 2.30 17.51
2.00 86.36 6.58 31.77 124.71 25.60 6.17 13.60
2.83 a 95.00 6.70 36.31 138.02 28.44 7.87 12.10
5.00 114.48 7.06 49.53 171.06 35.77 13.76 9.17
a Indicates baseline breakeven case.
than a fund without seed capital for a positive (negative) alpha, holding alpha fixed.
This is because the seed capital will be returned at a hurdle rate and no longer earns
the premium alpha. However, if we take the illiquidity discount into consideration, the
adjusted economic value, denoted by V ∗ = V − ID, of the fund with seed capital is always
greater than that without seed capital. Take the case alpha = 5% for example, the adjusted
economic value of the ESFs with 5% of seed capital is 156.12, compared to 154.44 for a
fund without seed capital. The main reason is that ψ percent of the ESFs manager revenue
is transferred to the outside investors via fees-for-seed swap, thus generating diversification
benefits for the fund.
One may note that the ESFs manager may be better off without any seeding invest-
ments. This is true only when the ESFs manager can reach the target AUM level for a
successful launch. If it is hard for the manager to achieve the target, she may turn to the
seeder and give up some fraction of her fees revenue due to lack of bargaining power. For
example, Panel B of Table 4 illustrates that the manager should give up 12.08% of her
fees in exchange of 5% of AUM from the seeder.
For an unskilled ESFs manager, α = 0, both Table 3 and Table 4 show that the economic
value of the fund equals to the initial investment S0 = 100, which means the ordinary
investor bears the loss to pay fees to the manager. As alpha increases, both the economic
value of the fund and the ordinary investors’ payoffs grow as we expected.
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Table 4 The table presents valuations of different agents’ claims with non-spanned risk
for various levels of alpha. Panel A and B report the results for the case with φ = 0 and
φ = 5%, respectively.
α(%) I∗ SP ∗ G∗ V G ID ψ (%)
Panel A: the seed capital ratio φ = 0
-1.0 65.28 0.00 25.90 91.18 22.46 3.45 0.00
0.00 71.16 0.00 28.84 100.00 24.72 4.11 0.00
2.00 86.76 0.00 36.80 123.56 30.70 6.10 0.00
3.29 a 100.00 0.00 43.95 143.95 35.88 8.08 0.00
5.00 112.09 0.00 53.36 165.45 42.37 10.99 0.00
Panel B: the seed capital ratio φ = 5%
-1.0 64.27 6.53 20.51 91.31 19.08 1.43 19.60
0.00 70.00 6.63 23.37 100.00 20.45 1.60 17.62
2.00 85.17 6.85 31.14 123.15 27.38 3.76 13.84
3.00 a 95.00 6.96 36.39 138.35 31.34 5.05 12.08
5.00 109.73 7.19 47.25 164.16 39.21 8.04 9.57
a Indicates baseline breakeven case.
5.3 Idiosyncratic risk effect, risk aversion and fees
It is obvious that the (subjective) value for the ESFs manager is generally an increasing
function of AUM and time t. Unlike the risk-neutral case, in the case of risk aversion the
subjective values are concave functions of AUM. This is mainly because of the nonlinear
terms in our pricing PDE (41). As shown in Figure 3, the more risk-averse the manager
is, the greater the illiquidity discount the manager has to bear. More specifically, the
illiquidity discount is very small when AUM stays at a very low level (e.g. below 40),
while it increases quickly and reaches its peak at 33 (for the case γ = 4) as AUM increase
to 200. Moreover, the right hand subfigure in Figure 3 indicates that the gap of the
illiquidity discount between the case γ = 4 and the case γ = 2 converges to zero as t is
approaching the end of the lock-up period T . Once the lock-up period expires, the ESFs
manager is out of the seeding business and bears no idiosyncratic risk any more.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the effect of the correlation coefficient ρ between the market
and the fund on the subjective value of the management compensation. Interestingly, the
management compensation is a not a monotonous function. It first increases with ρ to its
maximum point and then decreases afterward. On the one hand, managerial skills alpha
drops (α = µ− r − ρση)) as ρ increases, which causes a negative effect on the subjective
value G. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk decreases as ρ increases (keeping total
fund volatility σ unchanged), which is a positive effect on management compensation.
Therefore, the ESFs manager faces a trade off between the correlation coefficient and
idiosyncratic risk. Particularly, management compensation is an increasing function as
the positive effect of the idiosyncratic risk dominates the negative effect of diminishing
alpha for ρ less than around 20 %. As ρ continues to increase, the negative effect dominates,
and the function turns into a decreasing function.
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6. Conclusion
In this article, we developed a dynamic valuation model for the hedge fund seeding business
by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem of a risk-averse manager who
launches a hedge fund through a seeding vehicle. As traditional approaches to attract
the initial AUM and covering of organizational expenses becomes much harder for ESFs
managers in a much tighter financial landscape, nowadays more and more ESFs managers
are likely to turn to seed investors for early stages of capital by offering a certain proportion
of their fees through a seeding vehicle. The new swap specifies that a seeder commonly
commits to providing a remarkable amount of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an
“anchor investor” in a new fund in exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which
is usually a proportion of the fees that the ESFs manager generates from the entire pool
of assets in the fund. Our results indicate that the new swap not only solves the serious
problems of widespread financing constraints for ESFs managers, but can also be highly
beneficial to both the manager and the seeder if structured properly.
Moreover, we derived a closed-form solution for the fees-for-seed ratio, i.e. the seed cost,
as well as the manager’s value attached to the hedge fund seeding business. In addition we
presented a detailed numerical analysis in which we discussed sensitivity effects of various
model parameters such as the risk aversion coefficient as well as the skills factor α on
our results. Our analysis showed that, as we would expect, the greater the seed capital
obtained, the more fees the manager should give up. The fees-for-seed ratio is a linear
increasing function of the amount of the seed capital. However, more interestingly, unlike
an uninformed “rule of thumb”, the slope term in this linear relationship depends on
factors such as fund volatility and managerial skills. Therefore, the closed-form solution
of the seed costs in our model is much more informed and can be regarded as a theoretical
guide to the design of a seeding vehicle contract.
Our model assumes the ESFs manager is risk averse towards the hedge fund seeding
business, thus she suffers the illiquidity discount for her valuation due to unspanned id-
iosyncratic risk. Once the ESFs is out of the seeding stage and enters into normal stage,
the manager bears no idiosyncratic risk. We found that the more risk-averse the manager
is, the greater the illiquidity discount the manager has to bear, thus the lower her subjec-
tive value is. In addition, the manager bears more idiosyncratic risk for longer duration
of the lock-up period, i.e. the hedge fund seeding stage. Given fixed expected return and
volatility of the fund, the ESFs manager faces a trade off between the correlation coeffi-
cient and idiosyncratic risk. As the correlation coefficient increases, the positive effect of
decreasing idiosyncratic risk at first dominates the negative effect of diminishing alpha for
low level of ρ, but then is dominated by the negative effect of diminishing alpha.
More importantly, the ordinary investors are more willing to invest in an ESFs backed
up by seeders via a fees-for-seed swap. As our numerical results illustrate, the more seed
capital the fund gets the smaller breakeven alphas the ordinary investors demand for their
investment. Therefore, the seeding vehicle helps the ESFs attract more investors and get
sufficient capital for a successful launch. Moreover, our results show that the adjusted
economic value, denoted by V ∗ = V − ID, for a fund with seed capital is always greater
than that without any seed capitals due to ψ percent of the ESFs manager revenue is
transferred to the outside investors via fees-for-seed swaps.
There are various ways to extend this research. First, dynamic leverage could be incor-
porated into our model to further analyze ESFs managers’ risk shifting behavior, inspired
by Lan, Wang and Yang (2013). Second, we could extend our model to feature risk aversion
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among the hedge fund seeding investors to capture the illiquidity of hedge fund seeding
investment, see Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014), Wang, Wang and Yang (2012) among
others. Finally, it would be worth to capture the feature of partial information about
managerial skills in our model.
Appendices
Appendix A Market Value of the Hedge Fund
After the lock-up period, we assume that the fund enters into a normal stage and the
manager no longer bears the idiosyncratic risk, which is quite similar to the case discussed
in Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003). In the normal stage, the manager is paid via
both management and performance fees. The management fee is specified as a constant
fraction m of the net asset value while the incentive fee is commonly accompanied by a
high water mark (HWM) provision. Intuitively, the HWM Ht is the running maximum of
net asset value S when g ≡ ω + c′ , i.e. Ht = max{Su;u ∈ [0, t]}. In a more general setting,
for St < Ht, the HWM Ht evolves deterministically as
dHt = (g − ω − c′)Htdt, (A.1)
where g is the contractual growth rate at which H changes (generally zero or r) and c
′
is
the cost or fees allocated to reducing the HWM.
At any time t ≥ 0, we can compute the value of the total fees F (S,H, t) and the ordinary
investors’ value I(S,H) respectively as follows:
F (S,H, t) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)[mS + k(dHs − (g − ω − c′)Hsds)]ds
]
, (A.2)
I(S,H, t) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ωS + e−r(s−t)Sτds
]
, (A.3)
where τ , the stochastic liquidation time, is defined as τ = min{τ1, τ2} where τ1 is the
exogenous liquidation time and τ2 ≡ inf{t;St/Ht = l} is the endogenous liquidation time.
Using the same valuation approach as in subsection 3.1, the market values of the con-
tingent claims defined above satisfy the following ODE17
(α+ r − ω −m)SVS + 1
2
σ2S2VSS + (g − ω − c′)HVH + λV − rV + f(S, t) = 0, (A.4)
where f(S, t) represents any payment made to the claims to be valued for the two different
cases, and two boundary conditions apply as stated below.
Further, it is clear that the underlying economics of the problem implies that V (y) is
homogeneous of degree one in S and H, hence the solution has the form V (S,H) = HQ(x),
where x ≡ S/H. Substituting this expression as well as its derivatives into Equation (A.4)
gives an ODE
1
2
σ2x2Qxx + (α+ r + c
′ − g −m)xQx − (r + c′ − g + ω + λ)Q+ θx = 0, (A.5)
17 Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), the values of the contingent claims
are independent of time in our setup, i.e. Vt ≡ 0
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where θ = m for the case of management fee or total fees, and θ = ω + λ for the case of
payoffs allocated to the ordinary investors.
The solution to Equation (A.5) is given by
Q(x) =
γx
m+ ω + λ− α +Ax
ϑ1 +Bxϑ2 , (A.6)
where A and B are constants of integration and the two real roots, denoted by ϑ1 and ϑ2
solve the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2ϑ(ϑ− 1) + (α+ r + c′ −m− g)ϑ− (r + c′ − g + ω + λ) = 0. (A.7)
Solving the above equation and imposing the no bubble conditions m+ ω + λ ≥ α
18leads to:
ϑ1,2 =
−($ − σ2/2)∓
√
($ − σ2/2)2 + 2σ2($ +m− α+ ω + λ)
σ2
, (A.8)
where$ ≡ α+ r + c′ −m− g obviously ϑ1 < 1 < ϑ2.
In order to solve the ODE, two boundary conditions are required. One boundary con-
dition is determined as the asset value falls to the liquidation barrier, x ≡ l:
i(l) ≡ I(lH,H)/H = l,
f(l) ≡ F (lH,H)/H = 0. (A.9)
The other condition applies along the boundary x¯ ≡ 1 when the HWM is reset to H + ε,
while the net asset value exceeds the HWM at the level of H + ε and then the manager
obtains a performance fee of kε, reducing the asset value to H + ε(1− k). For ε→ 0, we
have
i(1) = (k + 1)i′(1),
f(1) = (k + 1)f ′(1)− k. (A.10)
One can identify the solution V (S,H) by specifying the general solution of the homo-
geneous ODE with the two boundary conditions defined in equations (A.9) and (A.10).
Solving the above equation and applying the no bubble conditions m+ ω + λ ≥ α pro-
vides us with:
I(S,H) = ω+λ
m+ω+λ−αS − (ω+λ)k+[ϑ1(1+k)−1](m−α)l
1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ2Sϑ2
+ l
ϑ2−ϑ1 (ω+λ)k+[ϑ2(1+k)−1](m−α)l1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ1Sϑ1 ,
(A.11)
F (S,H) = m
m+ω+λ−αS +
(ω+λ−α)k+[ϑ1(1+k)−1]ml1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ2Sϑ2
− lϑ2−ϑ1 (ω+λ−α)k+[ϑ2(1+k)−1]ml1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ1Sϑ1 .
(A.12)
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